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Abstract 
The sociological understandings of both cooperation and resistance at work are 
complex. This article contributes to knowledge about dialectic tensions concerning 
both collaborative and conflictual workforce orientations in the context of a ‘pre-
arranged’ union-management partnership agreement. It reports unofficial workforce 
militancy in opposition to both management and union policy regarding a socially 
constructed cooperative work regime. The article advances a ‘radical   pluralist’ 
analysis to understand the formation of worker interests and attendant workforce 
orientations within capitalism.  
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1. Introduction 
Sociology has a long interest in the shifting axis of conflict and cooperation at work, 
with studies examining dialectic forces affecting indeterminacy of the reward-effort 
exchange. This article contributes to related debates affecting the interplay of 
conflictual and cooperative relationships within a specific model of union 
management partnership. The data advances both a ‘commentary’ on and ‘challenge’ 
to neo-pluralist and Marxist perspectives explaining workplace dialectics (Edwards, 
1986, 2014; Ackers, 2002, 2012; Danford et al., 2005, 2013; McGovern, 2014). Two 
research themes are examined empirically: i) how workplace actors interpret and 
shape the ‘coexistence’ of workplace processes of accommodation (cooperation) and 
resistance (conflict), and ii), the implications of this dialectic interplay for attendant 
workforce orientations.  
 
The evidence comes from a single case study organization in the Republic of Ireland 
that espoused a cooperative partnership model. For anonymity and confidentially, the 
case has a pseudonym of Omega and the trade union is called Industrial Union (IU). 
The analysis has implications for ‘radical’ and ‘pluralist’ theoretical explanations of 
workforce orientations within capitalist economies.  
 
2. Frames of reference on moderation, militancy, and workforce orientations  
 
Definitions 
Both moderate and militant orientations relate to the formation of interests. 
Moderation is the accommodation between employees and managers based on 
understandings that respective interests are best fulfilled through cooperation. 
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Management engage employees, both directly as individuals and indirectly through 
representatives, in cooperative and integrated relationships to pursue mutual gains. In 
contrast, militancy is frequently portrayed as eschewing accommodation and instead 
worker interests are deemed to be ‘irreconcilable’ with those of managements’ 
(Danford et al., 2005:227). However, resistance should be understood in terms of foci 
and level. For example worker concerns may differ from management goals, yet that 
does not imply conflict will be clearly manifest (e.g. strikes). Edwards and Scullion 
(1982) suggest that conflict is evident in some work situations but not elsewhere. 
Moreover, the formation of interests may be examined beyond and separate to 
specific forms of conflictual action  that  occur in practice (Edwards, 2014:3). Finally, 
workforce orientations are the meanings people attach to their work context and the 
social processes that influence how they act and think with regard to that work 
(Watson, 2012:239). 
 
Contention between rival frames of reference stem from earlier debates on unitary and 
plural perspectives by Fox (1973), Clegg (1975) and Hyman (1975) (see Cullinane, 
2014). The concept of frames of reference has been enduring in employment relations 
theory and relates to what Heery (2014) defines as ‘zones of contention’ in explaining 
workplace tensions. By connecting with these zones of contention we engage with 
both neo-pluralist and radical interpretations and assess how these inform workforce 
orientations. To aid analysis, three rival frames of reference are outlined in Table 1: 
neo-pluralism, political Marxism, and radical (material) pluralismi.  
 
Neo-Pluralist Perspectives 
Unlike unitarism, pluralist perspectives recognize different interests between capital 
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and labour, and emphasize that conflict can be regulated through rules and institutions 
(Clegg, 1975; Budd and Bhave, 2008). Contemporary neo-pluralism assumes conflict-
based interests are not only counterproductive but self-defeating within capitalist 
markets (Ackers, 2014:16). For pluralist perspectives the key issue is not moderate 
behaviours per se, but resolving disagreement as an accommodative process  towards 
mutual gains outcomes (Boxall, 2013). Faced with variation in market and 
institutional contexts, neo-pluralism suggests that collaborative mutuality engenders 
higher quality employment outcomes for employers, unions and workers than conflict 
or class interest formation.  
 
Ackers (2002, 2014) is vocal in advocating a neo-pluralist paradigm, criticizing ‘an 
obsession of the British sectarian left with economic workplace militancy’ and 
Marxist expectations that major societal change can germinate from workplace 
grievances. This neo-pluralist strain revives Durkheim’s concern about how moral 
communities and social institutions bond work and society together, and thereby 
rejuvenates classical pluralist analysis. It claims to offer a normative vision for 
employee voice by promoting an ethical rationale for processes such as social 
partnership as an alternative to the (Marxist) goal of challenging capitalism. 
 
However, neo-pluralism and the quest for mutuality have attracted critique. 
Thompson (2013) points to instability in the on-going financialisation of capitalism, 
such that new employment regimes have not produced widespread collaboration. 
Danford et al. (2013) find that when it comes to trade union resilience and mutual 
collaboration, partnership is about as useful as a ‘chocolate tea pot’. Neo-pluralist 
analysis has a tendency to advance cooperation over conflict and trust-building over 
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power imbalances (Ackers, 2002:17). Arguably, neo-pluralist analysis has failed to 
capture how power resources are mobilised and used to regulate employment and 
favour employer interests over worker concerns (Dobbins, 2010; Dundon et al, 2014; 
Wilkinson et al, 2014). 
 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
Radical Perspectives  
Pluralism can be contrasted with various radical perspectives. A core differentiator is, 
rather than functional-institutional rules to maintain order and stability, radical 
schools emphasize both economic and political capitalist roots that exploit labour. 
Radical frames of reference are not homogeneous or singular and variation relates to 
multiple interpretations about dominant sources of interest formation and contestation 
(Frege et al, 2011; Heery, 2014). For some it is class relations (Hyman, 1975; Gall, 
2003b; Danford et al., 2005). Others see post-structural constructs such as culture, 
subjectivity or identity as sources of exploitation (Willmott, 1993; Fleming, 2005). 
We focus on the ‘zone of contention’ between political Marxism and radical pluralism 
in explaining the tensions between and within cooperative and conflictual workforce 
orientations.    
 
i) Political Marxism 
 
Radical-inclined theories question classic pluralist analysis focusing on maintaining 
order though institutions of job regulation (Cullinane, 2014). One radical strand, 
political Marxism, shares a general ideological discourse relating to debates around 
partnership and interplay of militant-moderate orientations. There is considerable 
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intellectual variation in Marxist scholarship, such that a single article concerned with 
other competing ideas cannot do it full justice (see Frege et al, 2011). Among others, 
contemporary contributions include Darlington (1994, 2014), Gall (2003a,b), Kelly 
(1998) and Danford et al. (2005, 2013), who all reject the notion that workers (unions) 
can gain from collaborative accommodation with employers. It is posited that workers 
would be better defining their interests around class-based struggles endemic of 
capitalist exchange and in so doing, political Marxists advance a prognosis about 
‘what needs to be’ (Gall, 2003b:317). Marxian interpretations assume that inherent 
tensions at work can be the root of system change through militant actions that foment 
class consciousness and/or union challenges to capitalism (Hyman, 1975).   
 
Militant unions are typically regarded as those willing to invoke strike action and 
articulate an ideology of opposing interests. A notable critic of moderation, Kelly 
(1998:126) outlines Marxist mobilization theory, the fulcrum of which is interests and 
the way subordinate groups define them: ‘Workers in capitalist societies find 
themselves in relations of exploitation and domination in which many of their 
significant interests conflict with those of the employer’. Similarly, Darlington 
(2014:9) charts historical strike waves as a key dynamic in the ability of unions not 
only to advance workers interests but also to challenge capitalism. In this analysis 
shop floor agitation often preceded periods of union strength, with rank-and-file 
activists mobilising conflict against the accommodative stance of bureaucratic union 
leaders as well as to improve work conditions. Darlington (2014:15) draws attention 
to the importance of left-wing political forces as one element in extending workplace 
struggle beyond the narrow sectional interests advanced by (some) union leaders. 
Such analysis is not confined to historical events and contemporary evidence is 
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reported from organizations in the UK like Ford, the Fire Service and London 
Underground, where cadres of workplace activists are identified as important conduits 
in mobilising conflict (Darlington, 1994, 2001). Danford et al (2005, 2013) argue that 
high performance work systems, including union-management partnerships, may 
appear to benefit workers (unions) but actually weaken worker interests by protecting 
the power of capital over labour. Consequently, prospects for moderation are rejected 
in favour of more militant opposition to a system protecting employer interests.  
 
Notwithstanding oversimplification, political Marxism shares certain assumptions 
about the logic of capitalist accumulation and evolutionary stages: (1) analysis of 
capitalist social relations of production leads to (2); a political strategy to challenge 
capitalism via mobilizing class struggle, or a tendency for capitalism to self-destruct, 
subsequently leading to (3); capitalism being superseded by an alternative (non-
exploitative) system (Edwards, 1986; Ackers, 2012). Marxist analysis is sometimes 
cautious in assuming capitalist employment relations will inevitably generate class 
struggle. Marxists variously point out why class consciousness is stymied; including 
false consciousness, the hidden nature of surplus value appropriation, worker 
sectionalism, or employer victimisation (Gall, 2013). Nonetheless, the scale of the 
systemic shift requiring class mobilization has left Marxist prescription wanting, 
especially among historical and contemporary employment policy analysis regarding 
the role of the state and possible abuses of power (Fox, 1985; Ackers, 2014).        
 
ii) Radical pluralism 
Radical variations of pluralism originate from an auto-critique of pluralism by Fox 
(1973, 1979), arguing that the basis of conflict and consent are deeper and more 
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socially embedded in structures of power and authority than pluralism can explain 
(Watson, 2012:290). Endorsement of pluralism as a set of values (something that 
ought to be) is very different to believing that enduring cooperation is adequately 
realizable through existing policies or structures to leverage institutional reform 
(actual practice) (Fox, 1985; Cullinane, 2014). In other words pluralist ‘values’ and 
adequacy of ‘actions’ to realize such values are distinguishable across time and 
context.   
 
Radical pluralism identifies with political Marxism in so far as agreeing that power 
inequalities and tensions are embedded within an exploitative (in a technical sense) 
wage-effort bargain. However radical pluralism diverts from political Marxism with 
regards to the second (inevitable class conflict) and third (emergence of an alternative 
non-exploitative system) stages of evolution. Important here is the analytical work of 
Edwards (1986, 2003, 2014) in delineating the concept of ‘structured antagonism’: an 
antagonist relationship where workers sell their labour power to work under the 
authority of employers, who in turn extract a surplus using a variable cocktail of 
controlling and cooperative strategies. Crucially, drawing a dividing line from 
Marxism and pluralism, Edwards (1986:55) suggests that ‘structured antagonism 
between capital and labour need not imply that capitalists and workers will meet as 
opposing classes with clearly opposed interests. But neither should analysis go to the 
other extreme of denying that structurally based antagonisms exist’.  
 
Radical pluralism draws on analysis of materialist antagonism. Marxian analysis has 
recognised the self-contained nature of workforce sectionalism and union protections 
(Beynon, 1973, Hyman, 1975). For example, Beynon’s (1973) informative analysis of 
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an emergent ‘factory’ class consciousness within Ford, points to powerful vested 
interest formation and attendant workforce orientations. Yet both labour and capital 
have a deeper and more enduring dependency on each other while possessing 
divergent (materialist) concerns. Employers need to control workers while also 
extracting productive creativity. Workers have an objective interest in resisting 
exploitation but also have to co-operate with employers to earn a living (Edwards, 
1986). A key distinction between radical materialist and political Marxist frames is 
that the former does not problematize how workplace conflict will spill-over to 
politicise societal struggle. That is to say, wider class struggle is not necessarily read-
off from relations of structured antagonism and divergent concerns at workplace level 
(Edwards, 2003; Thompson and Smith, 2010). To this end political Marxism is 
constrained because it does not theorise sufficiently the implications of vested-interest 
sectionalism for wider class mobilisation. In contrast, a radical materialist perspective 
views the capital-labour relation in the workplace as relatively self-contained. 
Edwards (1990) conceptualises the distinction as the ‘relative autonomy’ of the labour 
process within capitalism.  
 
In sum, radical variants of pluralist values can be evident in materialist-structural 
tensions that observe processes of constant adaptation at different levels, and the idea 
that interests are irreconcilable or will transcend into class struggle as a vehicle for 
challenging capitalism remains debatable and contestable (Watson, 2012:290). 
 
Contextualising workforce orientations 
The above review of competing frames of reference, although unavoidably brief, 
identifies both a theoretical and applied connection to understanding the interplay of 
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both conflict and cooperation at work. Attendant workforce orientations cannot be 
simplistically categorized as either supportive or opposed to management interests 
because worker priorities vary. Clegg (1975) identified flaws in Marxian inclinations 
that workers have some general interest in class struggle and a desire to overthrow 
capitalism, and called for empirical examination in specific work settings. Daniel 
(1973:61) argued that employees have different priorities in different contexts, so 
work orientations are potentially multi-pronged: ‘as far as the understanding of such 
workers’ behaviour is concerned the variations in their priorities and attitudes 
according to context are more important than any overall or general orientation or set 
of priorities’. For instance, in a ‘bargaining context’ workers focus on extrinsic 
economic rewards around the wage-effort bargain and management tend to be seen in 
oppositional terms. However, in the work context employees can focus on the 
intrinsic nature of the job and inter-personal relations, emphasizing a more 
cooperative orientation. On a spectrum, orientations can be characterized by conflict 
in some contexts and cooperation in others; thereby creating two ‘logically 
contradictory images’ of work relations (Daniel, 1973:39-62).  
 
Contemporary writers also illustrate how context affects worker orientations. 
Importantly, the Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) and Disconnected Capitalism Thesis 
(DCT) illustrate the power of external institutions in affecting formulation of worker 
interests (Thompson, 2013; Heyes et al., 2014). Indeed, managers themselves may be 
powerless to change the structural conditions of labour exploitation or make long-
term adjustment plans owing to short-term financial pressures (Thompson, 2011). The 
contingent nature of employees’ experience is contextually moulded over time by the 
interplay of external structural forces and internal social relations within capitalism. 
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Belanger and Edwards (2007:715) observe that employees define concerns (not 
always interests) through respective internalized actions at work and their 
interpretations of the interplay with external forces (see also Burawoy, 2013). 
Therefore it can be unhelpful to attach static labels like moderate or militant to 
complex interest-formation and fluid orientations about workplace concerns.  
 
Given these issues and debates, this article is concerned with how workplace actors 
interpret the coexistence of moderate and conflictual tensions, and what implications 
such a dynamic has for workforce orientations. Next the data and case study context is 
explained, and how workforce experiences were coded and analysed in relation to the 
tensions of conflict (militant) and cooperative (moderate) orientations.  
 
3. Research methods and context  
The research method utilised a form of Respondent-Driven Sampling (RDS) at a 
single case study company. The case has a pseudonym Omega and the trade union is 
named Industrial Union (IU) to preserve anonymity. Following Yin (2009) this 
detailed single case method facilitated a rich and unique approach to test the two 
research themes. In order to assess the interplay of conflict and cooperation, Kelly’s 
(1998) schematic dimensions of militant and moderate union postures were used to 
code and assess evidence from the case study, summarised in Table 2. 
 
TABLE 2 HERE  
 
The context of Omega and IU is important. Research access agreement prevents us 
from identifying the company. And because product market information or sector 
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location would risk company identification, we restrict descriptive background 
information about Omega and IU. Omega operates in the Republic of Ireland (RoI), 
which offers a unique context for assessing militancy alongside collaborative 
partnership. The RoI experienced over twenty years of uninterrupted centralized 
partnership until the financial crisis brought this to an abrupt end in 2009 (see Teague 
and Donaghey, 2009; McDonough and Dundon, 2010).  
 
Omega employs 210 workers in various occupations, mostly in manual operator roles. 
About twenty per cent of the workforce included migrant employees, many of whom 
entered the Irish labour market during boom times and EU enlargement. Omega 
provides a rich data source for several reasons. It is a new greenfield location and 
management decided to design the employment system from scratch. Workforce 
demographics include a range of nationalities, occupations and workers with varied 
employment and unionisation experiences. Even before these diverse employee 
groups entered the organisation, a ‘pre-employment’ partnership agreement was 
signed between Omega and external IU officials. Comparable to single union deals 
elsewhere (Bassett, 1986), management sought to socially engineer workforce 
cooperation using a binding no-strike clause and partnership process. However, 
cooperative behaviours were soon fractured by post-employment issues almost 
immediately after Omega began trading in 2001. In particular, two unofficial worker-
led groups sought to challenge the formal Omega-IU partnership agreement from 
below. The first worker group advocating a distinct militant posture we call the 
‘Opponents’, who are the more active and larger of the two unofficial worker-led 
movements. Respondents from the Opponent group estimated that about 25 per cent 
of all staff were active supporters or affiliates, or slightly higher when considering 
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these were drawn from the main operator grade: “circa 50 workers and we operate on 
feedback from the majority”ii. The smaller second rival militant group we call the 
‘Masked Resisters’, after workers from this group picketed company premises 
wearing masks to protect their identity. We could not verify precise membership 
numbers for this group and employees interviewed indicated that around “half-a-
dozen or so picketed company premises a while back”. Adding another layer of 
complexity, as well as resisting both the official union (IU) and Omega management, 
the two unofficial militant groups opposed one another, for reasons explained below.  
 
Data was collected from multiple respondents and incorporated a longitudinal element 
over a two-year period. Over 50 separate data sources were used, involving a total of 
71 repeat interviews and various communiqués: summarised in Table 3. First, 32 in-
depth semi-structured interviews were held with 18 respondents including managers, 
employees, and union stewards. Access to militant workplace agitators was gained 
using Respondent-Driven Sampling (Heckathorn, 2002). RDS is a research technique 
that helps researchers gain access and collect data about ‘hidden’ social processes or 
‘difficult-to-reach’ respondents. It is a similar method to snowball sampling with 
access gained from local knowledge and/or information from other respondents and 
documentary sources. While no respondent interviewed face-to-face reported being a 
member of either unofficial militant group, follow-up access was achieved through 
anonymous email addresses publicised in unofficial militant newsletters and media 
releases. Extensive email correspondence then occurred with two informants (one 
from each militant group). Email correspondence led to follow-up telephone 
interviews with the same informants.  
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TABLE 3 HERE  
 
‘Analytic research memo’ protocols (Bryman, 2012) were coded and written-up using 
the militant-moderate schematic in Table 2. Additional secondary data sources were 
important for validating primary research and involved scrutinizing documentary 
material including: two collective agreements, company personnel handbooks, and 25 
newsletters and press statements issued by unofficial worker groups.  
 
4. The empirical dialectical interplay of moderation and militancy 
Under theme one, the Omega case data offers a rare analytical lens on complex real 
life actor interpretations of both moderate and militant processes. 
 
Moderation: a ‘pre-arranged’ marriage 
Prior to commencement of Omega operations, management and IU Full-Time 
Officers (FTO) negotiated a five-year pre-employment agreement designed to 
engineer a ‘new’ cooperative workplace regime. By their nature pre-arranged 
collective agreements exclude employees from ‘ownership’ of the bargain. The IU 
negotiated a single agreement for staff prior to any employees commencing work. The 
agreement stipulated that as ‘a condition of employment each employee becomes a 
member of [IU] for the duration of his/her employment’. In short, a pre-arranged 
single union closed shop agreement was signed. It provided recognition for four shop 
stewards, who functioned through a partnership forum, attended by the IU FTO.  
 
The partnership agreement contained a continuity of service, or no-strike clause. If 
local talks failed, issues could be referred to third party dispute resolution or an 
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independent three-person panel for binding arbitration. The prohibition on industrial 
action banned both strike action and action short of a strike. IU was the only union 
prepared to concede a no-strike clause and the FTO explained this was a strategic 
decision to secure recognition. But the no-strike clause generated almost immediate 
dissent among workers; some of whom brought external adversarial union legacies 
with them and felt alienated by enforced cooperation. A senior manager admitted the 
clause was controversial but defended it on grounds of commercial reality:  
We would have huge penalties if we had a strike. It is fair to say it caused tension in 
the workforce. They say they wouldn’t go on strike but would like the right. 
 
Meanwhile, the IU official remarked:  
To this day we come in for an awful lot of criticism for signing the industrial 
peace/continuity of service clause. But negotiators were right to do the deal. 
 
Signatories widely heralded an innovative partnership agreement. There seemed 
considerable scope for collaboration through the partnership forum, with potential 
coverage of almost all ‘non-pay’ issues: business re-structuring, employment trends, 
commercial financial information, health and safety and training (among others). 
However, in practice the partnership forum rarely met and when it did had little effect 
on employer policy. Management were preoccupied with the operational demands of 
running a new greenfield facility and responding to commercial pressures. Senior 
management (mistakenly) assumed the pre-employment agreement provided a de jure 
platform for cooperation. One Director explained:  
The partnership forum did not always meet. If it was quiet people thought we don’t 
really need to meet, which is wrong. 
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The emergence of militancy  
The no-strike deal, coupled with an inactive partnership forum, acted as a conduit to 
mobilise worker interests in opposition to those of management. For some workers 
the no-strike clause and excessive IU collaboration with management ignited 
adversarial them and us traditions. For others, experience and conditions of the labour 
process were context factors that sparked militancy, but also conditioned cooperation 
from other groups such as some migrant workers and white-collar staff. On the 
militant side, managements’ application of discipline, work rosters, fatigue, and health 
and safety concerns galvanized momentum for militant posturing and surfacing of 
structured antagonism. For some employee respondents, attribution was directed 
towards the IU as much as Omega management. As withdrawal of labour or action 
short of a strike was prohibited, one manifestation of conflict was increased 
absenteeism. One shop steward explained: 
I was representing people who were going off sick because they felt they were being 
pushed by the company. They felt they were being harshly dealt with in 
disciplinaries. Your last alternative is not to come to work. 
 
Another manifestation of oppositional interests was unofficial militant workforce 
dissent. Emergence of conflictual postures stemmed from a combination of external 
sector traditions and growing disillusionment with internal labour process issues. An 
early indication was when a small group of Masked Resisters picketed the site in 
protest, all wearing balaclavas to protect their identity. However, there was 
sectionalist rivalry between the Masked Resisters and the distinct larger Opponents 
militant group. The smaller Masked Resisters group was anti-IU since its inception 
and campaigned for transfer to another union, owing primarily to IU’s no-strike 
agreement with Omega. In contrast the larger dissident Opponents group has been 
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very critical of management, although its union allegiance shifted over time: it was 
formerly pro-IU but eventually switched to an anti-IU stance due to dissatisfaction 
with the extent of moderation. The ‘Masked Resisters’ further disagreed with some of 
the ‘Opponents’ methods for mobilisation, such as circulating newsletters instead of 
direct agitation. 
 
The Opponents claimed to have galvanised support because they advanced an agenda 
around workplace concerns that resonated with workers: lack of effective voice and 
health and safety worries: 
We had no voice and very unhealthy safety practices. Any opinion was threatened by 
the company and they ‘managed out people’. They refused to address safety 
concerns. 
   
How these oppositional and conflict-based interests impact workforce responses is 
important. It seems that neither the Opponents or Masked Resisters are led by current 
shop stewards, although former union stewards and activists are members or 
associates. The main modus operandi through which the Opponents group object to 
accommodative relations with management is through its own regular newsletter. This 
is sent to management, the union, employees, and selected external outlets are 
lobbied. Multiple editions have been published over a five year period with a 
consistent articulation of alleged industrial grievances not addressed through 
partnership. The Opponents group argue: 
 
We do not agree with the partnership model. A rigid no-strike clause was imposed. 
There is no positive communication from any managers. 
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Due to highly derogatory personalized insults made by some militant factions, 
management instigated an investigation of their activities. Given the actions and 
language used by militant workgroups amounts to potential gross misconduct and 
possibly summary dismissal, their activities remained underground and highly 
secretive. Whilst this makes analysis difficult, one way of considering the impact of 
oppositional interest formation is to assess attendant mobilising action. 
 
Mobilizing agitation 
Although  rivals, the two groups share similar collective grievances concerning wage-
effort issues. Both groups have (separately) sought to mobilize workers around 
several perceived injustices: inability to strike, disciplinary procedures, work rosters, 
pay and union moderation, among others. In one communiqué, the Opponents group 
campaigned against the no-strike clause: 
 
Nobody wants to go on strike and all employees have a vested interest in service 
continuity ... (but) employees should have the right to choose how they resolve their 
disputes.  
 
The shift towards militant agitation related to perceptions that the union had been 
incorporated by management through partnership. The Masked Resisters argued: 
 
Their inaction undermines the basic principles of trade unionism. [IU] has lost all 
respect to any trade unionists within the organisation. 
 
With regard to ideology, militancy does not appear to be fuelled by notions of wider 
political allegiance or class struggle. The Opponents remarked: “we are not politically 
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affiliated and have a mix of views”. The same applied to the Masked Resisters, with 
one respondent suggesting he had “never been in a union before” and was motivated 
by a desire to address work grievances. In this case at least, militant interests were 
formed within a context of weak union power and specific workplace concerns. If any 
political ideology could be ascertained it was unequivocal opposition to a workplace 
regime predicated on moderation which did not rectify a series of wage-effort bargain 
concerns.  
 
To illustrate the interplay of militant and moderate interests, and attendant mobilising 
actions, Kelly’s (1998) framework presented earlier is used to summarize the 
evidence in Table 4 below.  
 
TABLE 4 HERE 
 
5. A patchwork effect on workforce orientations 
On the second research theme, we identify implications of militant-moderate interest 
formation for workforce orientations. 
 
Recasting moderation: a new collective agreement 
Partly as a counter-mobilization against the militant challenge, management and IU 
sought to further embed cooperative behaviours through a recast partnership 
agreement. Negotiations were protracted and it took eighteen months before a new 
partnership proposal was presented to workers. Unlike the initial partnership 
agreement, negotiation occurred against a difficult external backdrop of economic 
recession. The revised partnership arrangement includes several new features: a novel 
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employee voice process where workers can have regular access to shop stewards 
through a walk-in clinic on-site. The no-strike clause was replaced with extended 
disputes resolution procedures. A review of shift patterns was promised. On pay, the 
proposed agreement maintained a single (all-inclusive) salary which incorporated 
shift and other premia along with a pay freeze following a one-off 2.5% increase. 
Bonus payments were also conditional on industrial peace and organizational 
performance. The new agreement was presented by both management and IU as a 
major opportunity to enhance cooperation and reduce conflict. 
 
Yet, militant groups opposed the revised agreement. While the no-strike clause would 
ostensibly go, militant factions felt that actual ability to strike was constrained. The 
initial proposal was rejected by a two-thirds majority of the workforce, despite Omega 
and IU recommendations to accept. The scale of employee rejection would suggest 
the impact of interests formatted in opposition remained significant. Following 
rejection, union members were again balloted by IU on whether to conduct a final 
reassessment in local (rather than centralised) union-management talks. From these 
local negotiations some modifications were made, specifically an enhanced bonus 
payment and management endorsing a stronger commitment to review roster patterns. 
On a second ballot the deal was accepted by a very narrow margin.  
 
Balancing alternative workforce orientations 
Amidst militant workgroup agitation, the evidence shows an uneven dynamic in 
which cooperative behaviours fused with awareness of divergent concerns. For 
example, the scale of rejection of the proposed collective agreement in the first ballot 
and narrow acceptance in a second is indicative of alternative and shifting 
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orientations. The Masked Resisters did not oppose cooperation in principle, yet they 
felt that accommodation with Omega management was “social partnership gone too 
far”. An Opponent member argued that management failed to “respect the benefits of 
good industrial relations”. Interest formation and attendant workforce orientations 
were mostly rooted in ‘bread and butter’ wage-effort concerns. Many workers viewed 
management-union integrative bargaining as a legitimate way to further their 
interests, yet they objected to the ‘form’ of partnership as enforced cooperation. One 
consequence was detachment among workers towards their union and company. Trust 
in and commitment to the institutions of job regulation were not high among many 
employees; reflecting Fox’s (1974) assessment of the unfolding dynamics of low trust 
worker orientations. 
 
Divergent worker orientations ranged from disgruntled militant agitation; mainly 
moderate but also at times combative shop stewards; calculative employees who 
exchanged simple compliance in exchange for pay; and apparently content 
employees, many of whom were migrant workers with perceptions of favourable 
employment conditions compared to their homeland (e.g. Nigeria, Poland etc), as well 
as white collar clerical staff. One migrant employee commented: 
 
“I consider myself to be very lucky. I am very happy here”. 
 
Therefore, co-existence of moderate and militant worker interests also fused with a 
culturally diverse workforce, adding another layer of complexity. Evidently, wide-
ranging behaviours overlapped and co-existed, producing a complex patchwork of 
uneven orientations. The militant insurgency orchestrated conflict but also fragmented 
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collectivism. Several employee respondents were critical of the Opponents’ tactics of 
agitation. One worker caricatured their publicity material as the “loony news”. 
Another felt that because it often lambasted co-workers as co-conspirators with 
management, some employees were “drawn closer to management than they 
otherwise might have been”. Accordingly, the workforce did not have one fixed set of 
interests that could be easily delineated as moderate or militant. This fluidity points to 
the limitations of polarizing tendencies towards either consensus (neo-pluralist) or 
class-based systemic conflict (political Marxist) extremities regarding workforce 
orientations. 
 
6. Discussion and conclusion  
This research adds knowledge to existing sociology of work literature by exploring 
organizational paradoxes and dialectics. It provides two distinct contributions. First, 
patterns of interest formation are interpreted by actors alongside contradictory 
posturing, and second, how attendant workforce orientations are shaped by various 
historically evolving internal and external contextual factors. At Omega, the complex 
interplay of external and internal influences shaped the dialectic of conflictual and 
cooperative tensions. Contemporary developments in this regard justify a shift from 
orthodox pluralist theory to a distinctive ‘radical’ flavour of pluralist values that 
locate actions and social structures within capitalist accumulation regimes. It is 
important to distinguish between espousing pluralist values that favour voice and 
power-sharing, and the extent to which such values are actually realizable under 
contemporary neo-liberalism. One major implication in this regard is that neither neo-
pluralist or political Marxist frames of reference can adequately explain workplace 
tensions and the dialectics surrounding interest formation. A second implication is 
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that neo-pluralism has moved closer to a unitary ideology in advocating ‘new realist’ 
business arguments for performance gains based on voice and partnership (Heery, 
2014). We now expand on these contributions.  
 
Balancing dialectical patterns of moderation and militancy 
Regarding the contribution of the first research theme, the data illustrates that the 
dialectic of moderation and militancy at Omega evokes a pattern of work tension that 
neither political Marxist (Danford et al., 2005, 2013; Kelly, 1998, 2004) nor 
cooperative neo-pluralist perspectives fully capture (Ackers, 2002, 2012). The 
original no-strike deal at Omega reflected what has been termed shallow worker 
participation rather than inherent failure of partnership per se (Dundon et al, 2006; 
Dobbins and Gunnigle, 2009). Omega-IU cooperation was akin to what Bacon and 
Blyton (1999:638-640) call an ‘alliance of insiders’, comprised of a formal inner-
circle of senior union representatives and managers as executive decision-makers. 
Under the ‘alliance of insiders’ model, trade unionists often succumb to economic 
coercion, accommodating a new realism and altered balance of power. At Omega, the 
union became increasingly distant from workers because the new partnership regime 
proved incapable of addressing  worker concerns.  
 
The evidence supports subtler conceptualizations of militancy and moderate interest 
formation embedded in radical analysis of pluralist values and realization (Edwards, 
1986; 2003, 2014; Fox 1973; 1979; Watson, 2012). A limitation with both political 
Marxist and neo-pluralist perspectives is that they can focus too much on either 
conflict or cooperation, at the expense of the dialectic interplay. Furthermore, they fail 
to fully capture the contextual conditions sustaining or constraining cooperative 
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outcomes. In this regard, radical pluralism informed by materialist analysis offers 
deeper insight than neo-pluralism to explain why even progressive managers breach 
cooperative workplace bargains given the constraints of neo-liberal accumulation 
(Thompson, 2013; Edwards, 2014). Radical pluralism can be seen to view dialectics, 
including differences between contradiction and tension in a broader way, as a 
process of emergent adjustment to a range of competing materialist-institutional 
(internal and external) forces. Arguably, divergent workplace tension is a normal 
feature of neo-liberal modes of accumulation (van de Broek and Dundon, 2012). But 
there is no deterministic corollary that dialectic processes will generate the type of 
systemic change advocated by political Marxism against capitalist work regimes or, 
alternatively, in neo-pluralist terms, for functionally imposing a moderate social 
order. Radical pluralism, on the other hand, better captures adjustments and tensions 
within capitalism. It also illustrates that patterns of conflict and consent are ‘part of’ 
real life work experiences, yet at the same time workplace relations have a degree of 
relative autonomy ‘apart from’ wider societal structures.  
 
The context of workforce orientations 
Turning to the second research theme, Fox’s (1974) argument that managers who treat 
workers in a low-trust manner often engender low-trust behaviours, is resonant in the 
case. Faced with a militant grass-roots challenge to the pre-arranged cooperative 
regime, management and IU officials subsequently sought to smooth-out tensions by 
creating a ‘partnership mark two’. Importantly, the findings indicate that the 
mobilisation of worker (militant) interests that directly oppose those of management 
goals (cooperation) can spur attempts to construct stronger employment agreements. 
However, meaningful union-management consensus often requires robust institutional 
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conditions that are not widely realized in liberal market economies (Edwards and 
Sengupta, 2010). Given the narrow margin by which employees endorsed the recast 
partnership arrangement in  the case, caution is required in predicting a shift to a more 
stable cooperative regime. The point lends weight to Roche’s (1991) argument, in 
critique of Fox’s initial micro-pluralist sociology of trust dynamics, that workplace 
‘social’ assimilation can be more important than organisation-wide ‘system 
integration’ in shaping orientations.   
 
Importantly, the data contributes to knowledge about the unevenness and variability 
of workforce orientations, even within a single case. At Omega the workforce could 
not easily be labelled as predominantly militant or moderate. Workers did not have 
one static set of concerns and insurgent factions and official union channels were all 
advocating competing interests that shaped a multitude of orientations: militants 
clashed with each other, with moderate co-workers, with the union and company 
management. Meanwhile, moderate employees and shop stewards both supported and 
opposed  partnership. Making judgment calls on the merits or de-merits of moderation 
versus militant interests is not the main point of learning here. It is not that one 
approach served worker interests better or more fully than the other. Rather than the 
either/or consequence of adversarial versus consensual workforce orientations, 
agitation and accommodation created a fluid fusion of context-specific structured 
antagonisms across a variegated workforce.  
 
The evidence lends weight to a radical frame of reference over the overly 
accommodative analytical inclinations of recent neo-pluralism. Yet to dismiss 
pluralist values about how work (and society) ought to be arranged is somewhat self-
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defeating. While political Marxism has analytical utility exposing partnership as a veil 
to conceal employer control and domination over workers and unions, this is not the 
end of the story. One issue is how far radical contributions have to or even should be 
labelled Marxist, and whether such perspectives can permit adjustments or 
improvements in  the world that people live in now rather than espouse an alternative 
‘non exploitative’ society. Other than drawing on Marxism as a heuristic tool, 
Edwards (1986:94) states that ‘there must be some claim that the working class 
identify and struggle for specific class interests, in particular the overthrow of 
capitalism’. As it is seems unlikely that the prevailing capitalist order will be replaced 
by an alternative (non-exploitative) system anytime soon, it is arguably even more 
important to evaluate how workers develop strategies and responses within the 
confines of the system in which they labour, rather than wait for its complete 
transcendence or self-combustion. In this regard, radical application of pluralist values 
can deliver materialist improvements for those who are subject to work degradation. 
Interests are not irreconcilable in their totality and progress along a radical spectrum 
can offer hope and adjustment. This we advocate as ‘radical pluralism’ within the 
constraints (and opportunities) of materialist relationships predicated on evolving 
tensions embedded within capitalist accumulation regimes.  
 
In conclusion, radical pluralism offers a robust analytical prism to unpick the 
formation of multi-faceted worker interests that both challenge and accommodate 
management. Workers respond to real-life contexts they find themselves in, and to 
conditions perceived to advance or thwart their concerns. The implications of the 
dialectic of accommodation and resistance should be viewed in this light and subject 
to further empirical investigation in a variety of contexts. Ackers (2012:14) raises 
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fundamental issues that extend the debate beyond a polarised impasse. Saying work 
relations are ‘mostly’ asymmetrical and indeterminate, that ‘many but not all’ actors 
interpret policy in different ways, implies there is complexity that requires further 
scrutiny across contexts to embed greater theoretical generalizability. Future studies 
can advance knowledge by pursuing context-sensitive comparative analysis to reveal 
the dialectic interplay of conflict and consent shaping patchwork patterns of 
workforce orientations within an increasingly globalised system of financial 
capitalism. 
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Table 1: Three competing frameworks on militancy and moderation 
Frame of Reference Nature of Work Relations The Conflict-Cooperation Interplay Worker Orientations & Expected 
Behavioural Outcomes 
 
1. Neo Pluralism 
Draws on Durkheim to emphasize 
functionalist role of institutions to maintain 
order and equalize balance of power to 
regulate competing and common interests 
between workers and management.  
Emphasizes cooperation and trust over conflict 
and power. Conflict regulated through 
institutions (unions, employee voice).  
Neglects deeper structural and societal sources of 
conflict formation and power imbalances. 
‘New realism; Moderate attitudes; 
Partnership Agreements; Mutual gains 
expectations. 
 
2. Radicalism 
 
Economic and social system produces 
multiple contested interests between 
workers and management. Power 
imbalance and inequality undermines 
labour interests.  
Variable sub-perspectives that distinguish 
between differing sources of conflict (e.g. 
context, occupation, class, race, gender, culture, 
identity) and accommodation.   
 
Variable sub-perspectives that differ 
about work orientations and expected 
behavioural outcomes.  
 
a) Political 
Marxism 
Marxist economic determinism. Capitalism 
generates inevitable class conflict between 
capital and labour, which will lead to wider 
class challenge toward an alternative non-
exploitative society. 
Emphasis on conflict and politicised system to 
change mode of accumulation.  
Neglects basis and extent of workforce 
compromise/cooperation. 
Resistance; Mobilizing opposition; 
Worker (Union) militancy; Disorder; 
Anti-capitalist. 
b) Radical 
Pluralism 
Draws on materialist sociology of 
Durkheim, Marx and Weber. Capitalism 
creates structured antagonism between 
workers and management. No assumption 
this will directly determine wider class 
struggle. ‘Relative autonomy’ of labour 
process from accumulation system. 
Both workers and management co-joined in 
dynamic of conflict and cooperation. Shifting 
interplay between external factors and internal 
social relations. 
Structural, contextual and social tensions 
sustain ongoing ‘adaptation’ to 
materialist conditions between militant 
and consenting behaviours.  
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Table 2: Components of militant and moderate posturing 
 Component Militancy Moderation 
Goals Ambitious demands with 
few concessions 
Moderate demands with 
some or many concessions 
Membership resources Strong reliance on 
mobilization of union 
membership 
Strong reliance on 
employers, third parties, 
law 
Institutional resources Exclusive reliance on 
collective bargaining 
Willingness to experiment 
with/support non-
bargaining institutions 
Methods Frequent threat or use of 
industrial action 
Infrequent threat or use of 
industrial action 
Ideology Ideology of conflicting 
interests 
Ideology of partnership 
Source: Kelly (1998:60) 
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Table 3: Data Sources and Respondents 
Data Source Respondent Type Number of 
separate 
sources /  
respondents 
Number of repeat 
interviews / Communiqué 
 
Semi-structured  
interviews face-to-face  
Omega management 7 1xonce = 
4xtwice = 
2xthreetimes = 
1 
8 
6 
 Industrial Union full-
time (external) official 
1 1xthreetimes = 3 
 Industrial Union 
workplace shop 
stewards 
3 2xtwice = 
1xthreetimes = 
4 
3 
 Employees 7 7xonce = 7 
  18  32 
Follow-up telephone 
interviews  
Unofficial militant 
workgroup members 
2 1xtwice = 
1xonce = 
2 
1 
Email communications Unofficial militant 
workgroup members 
2 1xsixtimes = 
1xtwice = 
6 
2 
  4  11 
Documentary sources Militant workgroup 
newsletters and press 
statements 
25  25 
 Collective Omega-IU 
partnership agreements 
2  2 
 Omega Personnel 
Handbook 
1  1 
  28  28 
Totals  50  71 
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Table 4: Co-existing components of militancy and moderation at Omega 
 Component Militancy Moderation 
Goals Ambitious demands with 
few concessions: 
-Safer work practices 
-Fairer work duties 
-Better health & safety 
-Right to strike 
-Better pay 
-New union representation 
-Right to join union of choice 
Moderate demands with 
some or many concessions: 
-Fairer work duties 
- Strengthen partnership 
- Mutual gains 
 
Membership constituency Masked Resisters Group 
Opponents Group 
Other traditional unionists 
(some anti-IU) 
External IU 
Most IU shop stewards 
Moderate workers 
Migrant workers 
Membership resources Strong reliance on 
mobilization of union 
membership 
Strong reliance on external 
union, employer, third 
parties. 
Institutional resources Adversarial collective 
bargaining to pursue goals 
Willingness to experiment 
with/support non-
bargaining consensus 
institutions to pursue goals 
Methods Frequent threat or use of 
conflict: 
-Newsletter  
- Mobilize members 
-Strike threat 
-No vote on new agreement 
-Demands for shop steward 
committee to resign 
-Publicity campaign over 
injustice issues 
-Threaten non-cooperation 
Infrequent threat or use of 
conflict: 
-Cooperate with management 
- Revamp partnership model 
- Use procedures  
Ideology Ideology of conflicting 
interests: 
-Anti-partnership 
-Non-political affiliation, 
- Diversity of views 
-Improve wage-effort bargain 
Ideology of partnership: 
-Pro moderation 
- See adversarial IR as ‘old 
school’ 
- ‘Realism’/accept commercial 
pressures 
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i Unitarism and Egoism could be added as two other dominant managerial frameworks (see Budd and 
Bhave, 2008). However, as the main focus for this article is the interplay of militant and moderate 
workforce orientations, attention is directed to pluralist and radical frameworks. 
ii Management did not confirm any specific number for either of the militant groups but did 
acknowledge their numbers and activities to be highly disruptive.  
